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RECENT DEVELOPMENT 
J.P. DELPHEY LTD. P'SHIP V. MAYOR & CITY OF 
FREDERICK: DUE TO AN EXCEPTION IN THE OPEN 
MEETINGS ACT, MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENTS WITH 
LEGISLATIVE POWERS CAN VOTE TO CONDEMN 
PROPERTY IN A CLOSED EXECUTIVE SESSION WITHOUT 
ENACTING A PROPERTY-SPECIFIC ORDINANCE. 
By: Kristy Haller 
Under an exception found in section 10-508(a)(3) of the Open 
Meetings Act, legislative bodies may vote to condemn property in 
closed sessions without violating section 8 of Article 23A of the 
Maryland Code, which normally prohibits the adoption of resolutions 
in closed sessions. J.P. Delphey Ltd. P'ship v. Mayor & City of 
Frederick, 369 Md. 180, 913 A.2d 28 (2006). The Court of Appeals of 
Maryland found that there is no need for a legislative act or ordinance 
specific to the condemned property, provided that the vote for 
condemnation is conducted by a legislative body and not an executive 
body. [d. 
In 2000, the City of Frederick, Maryland ("the City") began the 
process of acquiring land to be used for a fourth parking garage 
located within city limits. Since 1997, the City had allocated funds in 
its budget for the garage construction. After studies were undertaken 
in 1989 and 1999, the City concluded that the property owned by J.P. 
Delphey Limited Partnership ("Delphey") presented the best location 
in terms of impact on the downtown area. An offer of $1,200,000, the 
appraised value of the property, was extended to Delphey, who in tum 
made a counter-offer for $3,000,000. 
In subsequent public meetings, Task Force recommendations on the 
Delphey property were adopted and a finance agreement for the 
construction of the garage was approved. Following a reappraisal of 
the property, the City offered Delphey $1,675,000, plus additional 
incentives. Delphey rejected this offer as well. 
On November 5,2002, the Mayor released a media advisory stating 
that following the public meeting to be held the next day, a closed 
meeting between the Mayor and the Board of Aldermen ("the Board") 
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would be held to discuss the acquisition of the Delphey property. 
Minutes from the session revealed discussions regarding how the 
condemnation process would work and if alternative payment methods 
to Delphey could be arranged. In the end, the Board unanimously 
voted to begin condemnation proceedings against Delphey's property. 
The City began condemnation proceedings in the Circuit Court for 
Frederick County, which held that the City was entitled to condemn 
the property. In an unpublished opinion, the Court of Special Appeals 
of Maryland upheld the trial court's decision, finding no legislative 
requirement that a property-specific ordinance be enacted before 
condemnation would be possible. The Court of Special Appeals of 
Maryland also found that the condemnation was an executive action 
and therefore required no specific ordinance. On appeal to the Court 
of Appeals of Maryland, the Court considered (1) whether the City of 
Frederick was required to enact a specific ordinance in order to 
condemn the property, (2) as a matter of first impression, whether the 
City violated section 8 of Article 23A of the Maryland Code when 
they voted for condemnation in a closed session, and (3) whether the 
City violated section 1O-508(a)(3) of the Open Meetings Act ("Open 
Meetings Act") when they voted for condemnation in a closed session. 
On the issue of whether an ordinance specific to the property was 
required for condemnation, the Court found in favor of the City. 
Delphey, 396 Md. at 195, 913 A.2d at 37. Both section 8 of Article 
23A of the Maryland Code and section 173 of Article 14 of the City's 
charter allow the Board to condemn properties. Delphey, 396 Md. at 
192-93, 913 A.2d at 35. Although the vote to condemn Delphey's 
property was conducted in a closed executive session, the Board was 
acting in a legislative capacity, thus falling under the provision of 
section 8 of Article 23A of the Maryland Code, which lists 
condemnation as an express ordinance-making power of municipal 
legislative bodies. Delphey, 396 Md. at 191-93, 913 A.2d at 35-36. 
Referring to past decisions, the Court noted that property-specific 
ordinances are not always required. [d. at 195,913 A.2d at 37. In past 
cases, prior annual budget approvals concerning the property being 
condemned were enough to show '''proper legislative authorization. '" 
[d. (quoting Boswell v. Prince George's County, 273 Md. at 522,533, 
330 A.2d 663, 670 (1975». In Delphey's case, the City had taken 
several authorized actions, including allotting funds for the garage 
since 1997 and conducting appraisals concerning the property. 
Delphey, 396 Md. at 195-96, 913 A.2d at 37. Sufficient legislative 
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authority was already in place and precludes the need for an ordinance 
specific to Delphey's property. [d. 
In discussing whether the vote to condemn Delphey's property 
during a closed executive session violated the Open Meetings Act and 
section 8 of Article 23A of the Maryland Code, the Court also decided 
in favor of the City. Delphey, 396 Md. at 202, 913 A.2d at 41. The 
Court recognized that an exception in the Open Meetings Act and 
section 8 of Article 23A of the Maryland Code are in direct conflict 
because section 8 of Article 23A of the Maryland Code is very broad 
and prohibits the adoption of "any rule, regulation, resolution or 
ordinance during a closed executive session," while the Open 
Meetings Act calls for "public business to be performed in an open 
and public manner," but allows for closed sessions to "consider the 
acquisition of real property for a public purpose and matters directly 
related thereto." !d. at 197-98,913 A.2d at 38-39 (quoting MD. CODE 
ANN., STATE GOV'T. § 10-501 (1984 repl. vol. 1995)). Accordingly, 
the Court concluded that the narrow Open Meetings Act exception 
overrides section 8 of Article 23A of the Maryland Code, thus 
legitimizing the City's actions. Delphey, 396 Md. at 197-200, 913 
A.2d at 38-40. 
In its analysis, the Court underscored the importance of public 
policy when interpreting the Open Meetings Act and referred to two 
previous decisions where the activities of the legislative bodies in 
question violated the Open Meetings Act. [d. at 200-01, 913 A.2d at 
40. In CLUB v. Baltimore Board of Elections, the Court found that the 
Baltimore City Council's failure to give proper public notice 
concerning meetings, where the drafting of a bill was under 
discussion, violated the Open Meetings Act. Delphey, 396 Md. at 
200-01, 913 A.2d at 40 (citing CLUB, 377 Md. 183, 832 A.2d 804 
(2003)). While in Baltimore Development Corporation v. Carmel 
Realty Associates, the Court held that the corporation performed many 
of the functions reserved for the Mayor and City Council and therefore 
operated as a "public body," requiring compliance with the Open 
Meetings Act, which the corporation had failed to do. Delphey, 396 
Md. at 200-01,913 A.2d at 40 (citing Baltimore Dev. Corp. v. Carmel 
Realty Assocs., 395 Md. 299,910 A.2d 406 (2006)). 
In contrast to the activities taking place in CLUB and Carmel 
Realty, the Court highlighted the public campaign by the City of 
Frederick to acquire Delphey's property, including mention of the 
possibility of acquiring or condemning the property in two previous 
2007] Open Meetings Act Exception 137 
public meetings, and adds that "no such evasive devices" as seen in 
CLUB and Carmel Realty are evident in Delphey. Delphey, 396 Md. 
201, 913 A.2d at 40. Thus, even under a policy argument, the Court 
found that the City took the appropriate steps in condemning the 
Delphey property. Id. 
In an era of rapid development and urbanization, extra care must be 
taken to safeguard both the fundamental right of property ownership 
and the public's right to have a voice in how its government functions. 
The Court's decision opens the door a little wider for municipal 
governments, making the process to condemn property even easier by 
no longer requiring public oversight at key stages of the process. 
